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In recent years a growing body of literature has begun to consider the possible presence 
of path dependence in the development processes of countries. This phenomenon has 
always been recognized in regional and urban studies because the path of development 
almost naturally follows a history-dependent spatial diffusion influenced by both 
physical geography and the quality of institutions. In this paper, I consider the case of 
firm concentration in Italy and its impact on local development. A large and growing 
literature has argued in favour of persisting effects of past institutions on current 
outcomes. Hence, in order to identify the impact of firm density on income, I use 
instruments from the history of a set of Italian cities: namely the presence of a 
university and status as a free-city state in the Early Middle Ages. I first show that those 
two variables had an important effect on the process of urban development between 
1300 and 1861, together with favourable geographic conditions. Then, when I use these 
instruments to predict firm density, I find that the elasticity of income to firm density is 
close to 0.1. This result is interpreted as providing evidence of the historical roots of 
agglomeration economies in Italy.  
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1. Introduction  
Cities were long considered as very similar to countries, so that the determinants of 
long-run growth and development were regarded as being human capital accumulation 
and the location of new firms. The New Economic Geography has instead pointed to the 
importance of firm density as an important determinant of wages and productivity in 
cities (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). Recently, Storper (2008) has added to the existing 
literature by arguing that institutions and physical geography should be considered as 
key factors in urban growth because both forces may provide incentives to firm location 
and influence the rate of return on both physical and human capital.. 
“Institutions” form a very broad category comprising both de jure political institutions 
and de facto institutions, which are the “ways that public sector agencies and private 
sector groups and individuals interact in detailed ways to shape the rules and resources 
of the economy” (Storper, 2008; p. 9).The importance of history has been convincingly 
documented and demonstrated as regards de jure institutions. In particular, Acemoglu et 
al. (2001) provide evidence that the mortality rate of European settlers in the former 
colonies affected institutional quality. In colonies with high mortality rates, European 
colonizers established extractive rent-seeking institutions, while in countries in which 
the mortality rate was low, colonizers established growth-promoting institutions that 
protected property rights. This result can be taken as a path-breaking insight into how a 
historical event can have considerable effects on past institutions; effects that, through 
their persistence, have an influence on current income levels (Nunn, 2008). Similar 
arguments form the core of Putnam’s well-known (1993) theory of regional 
development in Italy, for which he hypothesizes that past political institutions (i.e.   2
experiences of free cities during the Early Middle Ages) influence the current level of 
social capital and hence development. 
An alternative theory of economic development consists in the so-called “geography 
view”, which has been often considered as competing with the “institutions view”. The 
proponents of this theory consider physical and economic geography (i.e., what 
Krugman (1991a) calls first and second natures) to be as important as institutions in 
determining economic development (Bosker and Garretsen, 2009; MacArthur and 
Sachs, 2000).   
With very few exceptions (Acemoglu et al, 2005), the aforementioned literature has 
focused on cross-country development differentials, in whose analysis the role of 
geography is often found to be irrelevant because it is often proxied by distance from 
the equator, which does not prove to be salient in analyzing local development. The 
study of cross-city variation in development should be related to different measures of 
geography intended to quantify the natural advantage of cities. In other words, urban 
development is likely to be influenced by both geography and the quality of institutions. 
What is not clear a priori is whether the effect of geography on current economic 
development works through its impact on historic events or through a direct effect on 
current economic outcomes. 
Although apparently in competition with each other, both the “institution view” and the 
“geography view” point to the existence of path dependence in economic development. 
Through the persistence of de facto and  de jure institutions, as well as through 
economies of agglomeration in economic activity, institutional history and geography 
may shape paths of economic development (Martin and Sunley, 2006). Although the 
concept of path dependence is widely accepted by scholars in the economic geography   3
community, there is only some local-level evidence corroborating or rejecting this 
hypothesis, mainly because of the lack of data and of an appropriate theoretical 
framework. In this paper, I propose some econometric evidence on the institutional and 
geographical sources of path dependence in urban development through economies of 
agglomeration. In other words, I argue that denser places result from good past 
institutions and favourable geography, and this in turn results in higher levels of 
income.   
Figure 1 reports the positive correlation between firm density and income per capita in 
2001, highlighting the competitive advantage of denser cities. Since the seminal paper 
by Ciccone and Hall (1996), economists have engaged in a constant quest for 
exogenous instruments with which to identify the elasticity of income or wages to firm 
density. Interestingly, figures 2a and 2b show that firm density in 2001 was strongly 
correlated to urban population density in 1861 and, even further in the past, in 1500. But 
what were the driving forces of urban development that may considered to be good 
instruments for  firm density? In this paper, I argue that both geographical and 
institutional variables can be considered the driving forces of past development and 
might explain the current level of firm density. 
I have tested this hypothesis in the context of Italian cities because of the great 
variability of past institutional quality within the country, its geographical 
characteristics, and the economic outcomes of its cities. To this end, I assembled a 
unique dataset containing information on the population and characteristics of 563 
Italian cities over the period 1300-1861. I then tested whether and how urban 
development (as measured by city population) was actually influenced by both 
geography, as expressed by market potential and the physical-geographical   4
characteristics of city location, and by institutions, as defined by the quality of regional 
governments, the communal past of the city, and the presence of a university. I found 
that both geography and institutions have played a significant role in shaping the urban 
development of Italian cities and hence in the making of modern cities, although I found 
that market potential has a low explanatory power, and that the presence of university 
institutions has been an important factor in urban development and growth. 
A particular feature of the past institutions of Italian cities, as defined by the free city-
states of the Early Middle Ages, is that these de jure institutions formalized practices 
into commercial laws which lasted for several centuries and which, in some cases, are 
still applied in modern cities. This form of “legal persistence” can be conceived as 
generating long-run industrial development through the enforcement of property rights, 
leading to higher entrepreneurship rates. I tested this hypothesis and found that the 
institutional past is positively correlated with the firm density, and that this in turn has a 
positive impact on the level of current income. These results can be interpreted as 
evidencing the historical and geographical origins of economies of agglomeration and 
of path-dependent development. 
This paper adds to the existing literature by providing evidence on the importance of 
geography and institutions for urban development, and it proposes new instruments with 
which to identify the impact of firm density on development. It finds that taxable 
income elasticity to firm density lies in the interval [0.08-0.11], depending on the 
specification. 
Although the econometric framework may be regarded as inadequate because it fails to 
account for the multiplicity of development patterns postulated in the evolutionary 
literature (Martin and Sunley, 2006), my econometric analysis provides some robust   5
statistical results on the very long-run effects of historical events and adverse geography 
on city development. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the main literature and 
highlights some aspects of the research hypothesis. Section 3 reports a quantitative 
analysis of urban history in Italy showing that institutions and geography have mattered 
for urban development. The fourth section proposes an empirical model of the impact of 
firm density on income. This is estimated by means of instrumental variables in which 
the quality of past institutions is used as an instrument. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Geography and institutions in urban development  
In a neoclassical growth framework, an economic system grows according to its capital 
accumulation rate. However, this model does not prove satisfactory in explaining intra-
country variation of income where factor endowments are not the only sources of 
development (Acemoglu and Dell, 2009). Ciccone and Hall (1996) have proposed a 
framework in which the location of firms in space influences the productivity of places: 
that is, denser areas are more productive. From an econometric point of view, this 
relationship is difficult to identify because of endogeneity. Therefore required is a 
theory with which to identify variables that can explain the density of firms 
exogenously. 
It is very likely that regional and urban systems grow according to their economic 
structure, which is influenced by, among other things, their relative position and place 
accessibility (i.e. geography) and the quality of their institutions. In this section, I start 
from this simple proposition to review the literature on both the institutions and   6
geography views and then set out my arguments on the use of past institutional quality 
to explain current firm density. 
The role of nature in shaping the development processes of both cities and countries has 
been much debated by economists in recent years since the very influential papers by 
Acemoglu et al. (2002), Gallup et al. (1999), MacArthur and Sachs (2000) and Sachs 
(2001). In general, the literature has identified different channels of transmission of 
geography to development. 
In backward economies, specialized in agriculture, climate may have a significant 
impact on productivity and, in the long run, on the adoption of different technologies 
(Comin et al., 2006; Diamond, 1997; Sachs, 2001). Moreover, in those same poor areas, 
the “disease burden” in terms of malaria diffusion increases the overall mortality rate 
and hence reduces the economy’s growth rate. The diffusion of malaria as a proxy for 
the adverse effect of geography is very important because this disease is strictly related 
with unhealthy environmental conditions (Diamond, 1997; Percoco, 2009; Gallup and 
Sachs, 2001).  
Over the historical period observed by the present study, i.e. 1300-1861, diseases such 
as plague, smallpox, cholera and malaria afflicted Italian cities and reduced their 
populations even significantly. The Black Death in 1347-1351 killed almost one third of 
the European population (Cipolla, 1974), while the plague of 1630-1631 killed a similar 
proportion of the Italian urban population, with a mortality rate ranging from 12% in 
Florence to 61% in Verona
1 (Cipolla, 1989). 
                                                           
1 Interestingly, Cipolla (1989) argues that part of the variability in the mortality rates of the 1630-1631 
plague was due to differences in urban health care institutions. In particular, Tuscany had an especially 
active system of Uffici di Sanità (“Public Health Offices”). As a consequence, the mortality rate of 
Florence was very low (12%).   7
Between the Black Death and the last epidemics in 1630-1631, several episodes of 
plague occurred in Italy. Cipolla (1974) reports 21 epidemics in Venice and 23 in 
Florence.
2 Interestingly, physical geography may help reduce the disease burden for 
epidemics of this kind. In particular, more isolated cities, possibly in mountain areas, 
were comparatively less affected by plague epidemics.
3 However, in those cases, 
geography also had the contrary effect of increasing transport costs and reducing the 
development of cities.   
Besides climate and the relative disease burden, geography makes the transport of goods 
more costly, so that firms located in remote areas are less competitive.   
As convincingly argued by Duranton (1998), the economic development of the pre-
industrial city was deeply influenced by the “tyranny of distance” because physical 
space and transport costs introduced important frictions in economic space. The number 
of cities in a given system is thus a function of transport costs and agricultural surpluses 
(Bairoch, 1988; Braudel, 1984; Pirenne, 1925). In particular, as demonstrated by 
Duranton (1998), the “tyranny of distance” does not predict city size, but rather sets 
upper and lower bounds on the size of cities. The reason is that the maximum city size 
increases when all the agricultural surplus produced in the countryside is consumed 
during the transport process. The lower bound is set by the same reasoning. In other 
words, geography shapes urban development in a variety of ways, ranging from high 
transport costs to the morphology that may significantly influence the location of 
economic activities. 
                                                           
2 Note that the hypothesis of a positive impact of adverse geographical conditions has been convincingly 
tested by Nunn and Puga (2008) in the case of the ruggedness of territory in Africa and its defensive role 
against the slave trade.  
3 Note that the decision to locate cities was made in the past according to two competing objectives: the 
minimization of transport costs or the minimization of health and military risks. Hence, mountain areas, 
because they were almost isolated, were particularly attractive for the second reason.   8
However, as noted earlier, the “tyranny of distance” does not fully explain actual city 
size. In fact, the quality of institutions has been identified as a crucial source of 
development at country, regional and urban level. From an institutional-economic 
viewpoint, North (1981, p.3) defined institutions as “the rules of the game in a society 
or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. In 
the pre-industrial period, guilds were the pro-market institutions in the sense that they 
sought to increase inter-city trade in order to increase demand and production. However, 
the guilds system was only one part of the much more complex institutional structure of 
pre-industrial cities.   
Particularly interesting for the purposes of the present paper is DeLong and Shleifer’s 
(1993) seminal work in which they presented results on the relevance of regional 
institutions in explanation of urban development. In the case of Europe in the period 
between 1000 and 1800, they found that cities under absolutist regimes grew less than 
cities under non-absolutist governments, possibly because of higher taxation under 
revenue-maximizing monarchs.
4  
On analyzing the contemporary development geography of Italy, Putnam (1993) argued 
that trust and the quality of local government affect the level of development by 
reducing transaction and coordination costs. Putnam (1993) also argues that social 
capital is greater in areas in the North where, in the Early Middle Ages, independent 
city states were widespread.
5  
                                                           
4 A similar result is reported in a recent paper by Henderson and Wang (2006) on contemporary 
worldwide cities. Interestingly, they find that technological innovations have large impacts on bigger 
cities, while the process of democratization affects smaller cities. Henderson and Wang conclude that 
those opposing effects may have been the reason why the worldwide relative size distribution of cities 
remained unchanged from 1960 to 2000.  
5 In a recent and interesting paper, Guiso et al. (2007) have provided empirical support for the view that 
the current levels of social capital in Central-Northern Italian municipalities depend on the communal 
past of those cities. Similarly, Tabellini (2007) finds that past political institutions explain current culture 
in European regions, which, in turn, is positively related to income level.    9
On this view, the existence of independent communal republics (Repubbliche 
Comunali) in several areas of the North gave rise to a long-lasting civicness which in its 
turn produced higher levels of trust and in general of social capital. Interestingly, the 
rise of Repubbliche comunali in northern Italy can be viewed as an historical accident. 
In particular, in the Early Middle Ages the main concern of governments was the 
defense of cities against enemy attacks. In order to minimize defense costs, citizens in 
the North self-organized into oligarchic democracies. In the South, Frederick II 
maintained a centralized defense policy together with a slight decentralization of fiscal 
policy. There is no evidence on the differences in the effectiveness of the defense policy 
between the two parts of the country, although the economic consequences of the choice 
were large and persistent. In fact, in the aftermath of the death of Frederick II, rent-
seeking local lords condemned Southern cities to underdevelopment because of higher 
tax rates and poor rules on property rights (Ascheri, 1994).   
Putnam’s hypothesis (1993) therefore postulates that a relatively minor difference in de 
jure institutions resulted, in the long run, in considerable differences in de facto 
institutions and social capital. But why do past political institutions influence the current 
level of development? One possible reason is the existence of multiple equilibria in the 
intergenerational transmission of beliefs, so that agents with a low-quality culture   
transmit good values only in the case of shocks, while agents with good culture always 
transmit good culture (Guiso et al., 2007).  
Although appealing, this process could be viewed as only one of the possible channels 
of transmission of the institutional history of Italian cities. 
A very important feature of the Repubbliche Comunali has been neglected by most of 
the aforementioned literature, namely the fact that urban governments enacted the so-
                                                                                                                                                                          
   10
called  Statuti Comunali, which were similar to local constitutions. The interesting 
feature of these statutes was the prevalence of commercial law (which is indicative of 
the market orientation of communal institutions) which was applied until the 1950s and 
in some cases is still adopted in some cities (Cattini and Romani, 2001).
6 In fact, after 
the unification of Italy, the rules formalized in the Statuti Comunali evolved into formal 
commercial local rules  maintained by the local Chambers of Commerce. 
Obviously, such norms evolved over the centuries, but what I wish to stress here is the 
importance of the Statuti Comunali in enhancing an early rule of law which persisted 
across the centuries as a formal economic institution (Cattini and Romani, 2001).  
The economic literature has reached broad agreement on the importance of the rule of 
law in enhancing entrepreneurship and hence economic development (Audretsch, 2007). 
Cities in which norms were stable and written, and which were governed by market-
oriented institutions, were more likely to become important commercial or proto-
industrial centers. Interestingly, the persistence of the rule of law across the centuries 
guaranteed, along with favorable economic geography conditions, the persistence of 
entrepreneurial behavior. It is consequently unsurprising to find that industrial districts 
arose in cities and towns with a communal past (Cattini and Romani, 2001; Putnam, 
1993). 
The hypothesis of the importance of Statuti Comunali as a source of long-run 
development is also borne out by recent studies in economic geography. As 
convincingly pointed out by Martin and Sunley (2006), one source of path dependence 
consists in region-specific institutions which enable specific economic and regulatory 
                                                           
6 The strength over  time of economic norms autonomously set by cities is confirmed by the fact that after 
the Papal State was established in Central Italy, also by annexing cities which had previously been city-
states, Pope Innocent III gave wide autonomy to those city parliaments as in terms of economic and fiscal   11
institutions to emerge. In particular, habits and conventions are among the most 
important factors driving the location of new firms and hence economic growth 
(Boschma and Lambooy, 1999; Storper, 1997).  
It should be mentioned in this regard that also Southern cities developed forms of 
autonomy from the central State. During the tenth century, Southern Italy was 
sufficiently developed to attract merchants from throughout the Mediterranean basin. 
Normans arrived in 999 and founded a kingdom by conquering or annexing southern 
Italian cities. The most important of those cities had the status of universitas, i.e. cities 
endowed with an institutional structure very similar to that of the German and French 
independent cities (Ascheri, 1994). There are several reasons for the long-run failure of 
the universitas: here I shall point out only the most important ones as identified by 
Ascheri in his seminal work of 1994. Firstly, although universitas had a formalized 
corpus iuris which regulated relationships both between the city and the central 
government and among private agents within the city, those norms were often violated 
by the Norman kings and local lords in order to satisfy vested interests. Secondly, whilst 
the Repubbliche Comunali were democratic states with market-oriented institutions, the 
universitas  were ruled by local lords, mainly landowners, interested in maximizing 
fiscal revenues and profits from agriculture. As a consequence, Southern cities were for 
centuries uncongenial to the birth of firms. 
To sum up, both geography and institutions can be conceived as key factors in urban 
development. However, institutional history may exert persistent effects on the 
economic environment, not only through culture, as the previous literature has argued, 
but also through formal norms which persist and evolve over the centuries. In particular, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
matters. Also indicative of the importance of such norms is the fact that they persisted after the process of 
legal convergence begun in the aftermath of the Unification of Italy in 1861.   12
the hypothesis put forward in this paper can be summarized as in figure 3. It will be 
assumed that past institutions provided fertile soil for market development which in its 
turn stimulated entrepreneurship. On the other hand, geographical conditions are 
important per se because transport costs, although they decrease over time, are still 
relevant to explanation of firm productivity differentials. Hence, in what follows I do 
not assume that geography impacts on development only through a particular channel. 
Rather, I assume that geography has a persistent and direct effect on current 




In econometric terms, this means that I shall make use of past institutions as instruments 
with which to identify the relationship between firm density and income. Despite their 
statistical properties, good instruments need a theory to justify their use. In this section I 
have argued that the experience of free city-states and of Statuti comunali were 
important factors in enhancing property rights and hence entrepreneurship. In the next 
section I shall verify whether this argument is supported by empirical evidence by 
reporting estimates of the impact of geography and institutions on the process of urban 
development in Italy in the period 1300-1861. 
 
3. Geography and institutions in the making of the modern Italian cities 
3.1 Description of the variables 
As regards my dependent variable, I use data from Malanima (1998), who provides 
population estimates for cities with more than 5,000 inhabitants on a centennial basis   13
over the period 1300-1861 (i.e. 1300, 1400, 1500, 1600, 1700, 1800, 1861). Appendix 1 
contains the list of cities in the sample. 
Some details on the characteristics of Malanima’s (1998) dataset on Italian cities (1998) 
may prove useful. A 5,000-inhabitant threshold was used to maximize the number of 
cities in the sample and to minimize errors in population size. In other words, the 
dataset includes centers when they exceed a population of 5,000 and excludes them 
when the population falls below the threshold. Data were collected only once in a 
century owing to a lack of reliable information on small centers and for most Southern 
cities.   
Malanima (2005) proposes three stages in the urbanization of Italy. The first occurred 
between the tenth century and 1350, during which period relatively new centers 
increased in population (Amalfi, Cuneo, Ferrara, Udine, Venice and many other cities). 
At the same time, the urbanization rate became higher in the Center-North than in the 
South. The second phase was during the period 1350-1861, while the third one started 
with the Unification of Italy in 1861 and has continued until the present day. 
From the fourth century onwards, urbanization declined and several cities disappeared. 
However, in 1200 other cities underwent very large population growths: Alessandria, 
Amalfi, Catanzaro, Cuneo, Fabriano, Ferrara, Foggia, l’Aquila, Lecce, Macerata, 
Molfetta, Udine, Venice and Viterbo (Malanima, 2005). In the same period, towns in 
the North and in the Center began to grow faster than Southern ones. In 1300 the 
urbanization rate was higher in the Center-North (21.4%) than in the South (18.6%). In 
the same period, the triangle formed by Florence, Milan and Venice became the core of 
Italian development, with 97 cities exceeding 5,000 inhabitants, while 26 had 10,000 
inhabitants and 13 had 15,000 (Malanima, 2005). It should be mentioned that this was   14
the period with the largest number of Repubbliche comunali, and was hence a period of 
important institutional innovation. 
The second period of Italian urban history covers a very long time-span and largely 
coincides with the period of observation for the present section, i.e. 1350-1870. 
Malanima (2005) found that the Italian urbanization rate declined over this period from 
21.4% to 16.2%. Interestingly, the pattern of the urbanization rate reflected the 
declining importance of the Italian economy between the sixteenth and nineteenth 
centuries (Braudel, 1984). In 1500, the urbanization rate in Central-Northern Italy was 
16.4%, which was almost three times the Western Europe average and five times the 
English rate. This figure changed dramatically at the end of the period, when the Italian 
urbanization rate was 3.4 points lower than the European average and only one third of 
the English rate. 
The decline of Italy’s importance in Europe was also reflected by the decline of the 
Italian population as a fraction of the European population as a whole. In fact during the 
period 1300-1800 the percentage of the Italian population over the total population of 
Europe fell from 30.5% to 15.9% (Bairoch, 1988). 
As table 1 shows, in 1300 the largest Italian city was Milan, while Palermo was the 
biggest city in the South, as well as the only Southern city in the ranking. The hierarchy 
in 1300 was deeply influenced by the legacy of Repubbliche Comunali such as Bologna, 
Brescia, Cremona, Florence, Padua, and Siena, and also by the presence of two of the 
four Repubbliche Marinare, namely Genoa and Venice (the other two were Amalfi and 
Pisa).    15
Interestingly, it seems that, with only few exceptions, the core of the urban hierarchy in 
Italy as in 1861 was set up  in 1500 and stabilized over the centuries until Unification in 
1861, and thereafter in 2001 with the sole exception of Naples.   
 
[Insert tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows the average population by macro-region and city size. In this case, too, 
Italy’s well known dualism is evident, given that average city size in the Center-North 
was almost double that in the South, although slight convergence occurred over the 
centuries as the average size of Northern cities decreased and that of Southern ones 
increased. 
Let us now turn to the explanatory variables of urban development. As stated in the 
previous sections, there are good reasons to maintain that urban development has been 
historically influenced by both geography and institutions. In the model sketched by 
Duranton (1998), the higher the transport costs, the lower is the bound limiting city size. 
In other words, transport costs are decisive for city size. In my analysis, I proxied 
transport costs with several variables: altitude, road and waterway accessibility, and the 
existence of a port.
7  
I expected altitude to correlate negatively with urban development as expressed by city 
size because transport costs are higher when goods are shipped to or from mountain 
areas. As a consequence and ceteris paribus, mountain cities are less attractive to people 
because of lower productivity, lower wages and higher prices of goods. 
The second measure of geography was roads and waterway accessibility. Italy’s road 
infrastructure network was mainly built by Romans and it expanded slowly over time.   16
The index of accessibility took value 1 if the city was on the Roman road network and 0 
otherwise. For inland waterways accessibility, the index was a dummy variable taking 
value 1 if the city was on a navigable river and 0 otherwise.
8  
Finally, the presence of a port in the city as a major facility was regarded as likely to 
influence the development process profoundly (Fujita and Mori, 1996). In fact, the 
dramatic increase of international trade during the late Middle Ages was mainly driven 
by two factors (du Jourdin, 1993): innovation in shipping technology and the rise of 
capitalist institutions. As first argued by Braudel (1984) and empirically demonstrated 
by Acemoglu et al. (2005), the focal point of international trade until the end of the 
seventeenth century was the Mediterranean Basin. And in that geographical context, 
Italian cities played a crucial role as both shippers and traders (du Jourdin, 1993). 
However, with the rise of Atlantic trade, the baricenter of international trade shifted to 
Northern Europe, exacerbating the poor economic circumstances of cities in the South 
whose economies, highly specialized in agriculture, suffered substantially from the 
competition of cheaper goods coming from overseas (De Rosa, 2003). However, as 
pointed out by Cipolla (1965) and Munro (1999), geography, in terms of distance from 
the Northern range, was not the only reason for the decline of some Italian cities in the 
eighteenth century: also different sailing technologies and the increased risks due to 
local conflicts in the Mediterranean basin were also key factors.
9   
The analysis reported here also considered the economic geography that characterizes 
city locations. In fact, the New Economic Geography literature has convincingly 
                                                                                                                                                                          
7 Appendix 2 provides a detailed description on the sources and construction of all variables. 
8 Both accessibility variables are time-invarying. In a previous version of the paper I used road 
accessibility indicators as varying across the time because of network expansion. However, because the 
econometric results were qualitatively similar, I decided to rely on the time-invarying variable in order to 
reduce measurement error. 
9 Pozzolo (2007) reports an increase of 250% circa between the end of the fifteenth and the seventeenth 
centuries in insurance rates for goods shipped in the Mediterranean Sea.   17
demonstrated the importance of market potential as a determinant of trade flows. With 
regard to cities, de Vries (1984) proposed an index, also used by Bosker et al. (2008), 
which defines the urban potential as: 
 










   
 
where Popj is population of city j, Distij is the great circle distance between city i and 
city j, and wij is a distance weight function. In particular, we consider the following 
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It should be noted that the urban potential indicator as defined by de Vries (1984) and 
Bosker et al. (2008) has been simplified in order to make computation easier, without 
losing any generality. Also to be noted is the value wij = 0.75, which has been attributed 
on the basis of the qualitative accessibility indicator discussed above. Associated with 
this value is a threshold of 50 kilometers because it is assumed that no interregional 
trade takes place over distances exceeding one day’s travel by horse.
10 
At this point caution is required in correctly interpreting urban potential. In fact, market 
potential is commonly associated with the potential profitability of interregional trade. 
In the Middle Ages and the early Modern Age, trade volume was extremely low   18
because of high tariffs (the gabella) and high transport costs. In fact, a given good 
produced in city A to be sold in city D crossing the borders of B and C was taxed three 
times, even if those cities belonged to the same state. This fiscal system had two 
implications: 
a)  the important role of inland waterways, which reduced the tax burden (Munro, 
1999); 
b)  the incidence of interregional trade was very small. 
As regards point b), it should be noted that the largest portion of trade was between the 
countryside and the core city. In fact, larger cities were often the result of large arable 
fields. For these reasons, I imposed a cut-off point at 50 kilometers for urban potential. 
As concerns institutions, I used the data in Tabellini (2007), where past regional 
institutions are coded following the variable “Constraints on the Executive” as in the 
POLITY IV database. This variable (institutions) varies from 1 (unlimited authority) to 
7 (accountable executive, constrained by checks and balances). I  extended Tabellini’s 
(2007) dataset to cover 1300 and 1400. The main sources of information for this 
purpose were Ascheri (1994) and DeLong and Shleifer (1993). It should be pointed out 
that my measure of institutional quality was at regional level, while some cities in the 
same political system could differ because of their culture and institutional history.
11 In 
particular, this concerns the fact that a number of Center-Northern cities in the Early 
Middle Ages were independent republics where capitalistic institutions were crucial in 
shaping economic development. The relevance of Comuni has also been recognized by 
Putnam (1993) who argued that North/South differences in civicness may be explained 
in terms of a civic ethos with respect to property rights protection, inequality aversion 
                                                                                                                                                                          
10 Personal communication offrom Marco Cattini, professor of Economic History at Bocconi University. 
11 In line with Tabellini (2007), I assume borders to be the current ones.   19
and rule of law. All these features, which largely affect economic development, are 
direct consequences of the institutional pasts of cities and regions, and in particular of 
the existence of independent and democratic forms of urban government (Ascheri, 
2006; Guiso et al., 2007; Milani, 2005). In my analysis I hypothesised that cities under 
regional capitalistic regimes with a Comune past were more developed and grew to a 
greater extent than cities under absolutist regimes. In my dataset, the time-
invariantvariable comune took value 1 if the city was a Repubblica Comunale and 0 
otherwise. 
Bosker et al. (2008) use a dummy variable on capital cities meant to be a politico-
institutional variable. However, I could not find reliable information on this aspect 
because, according to Alfani (2005), during the period 1300-1861 too many cities lost 
or acquired the “capital city attribute”. In particular, in a descriptive analysis of some of 
the North Italian capitals, Alfani defines the rationalization of capital cities during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a “capitals holocaust”. In addition, several so-
called “capitals” were actually Comuni. For my purposes, I preferred to rely on the 
variable comune indicating a city’s communal past because it has a clear interpretation 
in terms of the impact of institutions. 
According to Ascheri (1994), medieval universities should be regarded as liberal 
institutions because teaching was relatively free, and so was the internal organization of 
both students’ and professors’ cultural activities. This implies that the presence of a 
university in a pre-modern city should not be considered a proxy for human capital, but 
rather as an institution improving urban governance. In order to estimate the impact of 
university location, I introduced the variable universityit, which took value 1 if city i had 
a university in century t and 0 otherwise.    20
 
3.2 Empirical evidence 
I began the empirical analysis by considering urban development differences. The first 
specification tested was as follows: 
 
(2)   it it i i i j t it potential urban port ity accessibil altitude d pop ε β β β β δ + + + + + = 3 2 1  
 
where popit indicates log-population of city i at time t, altitudei is a dummy variable 
taking value 1 if the city’s altitude is above 500 meters, and accessibilityit indicates the 
road and inland waterway accessibility indices described in the previous sub-section. 
Variable porti is a dummy variable for the presence of a major port. Urban potential is 
expressed in log and defined from equation (1). Equation (2) was estimated by means of 
a GLS random effect estimate with a complete set of time and regional dummies (dt and 
δj respectively). 
Model 1 in table 3 reports the results for equation (2). All the estimated coefficients 
have the expected signs. In particular, mountain cities have smaller populations than 
cities, although this is not found to be significant. The presence of a port is of particular 
importance for urban development because it increases the city population by about 
5,200 inhabitants. As regards accessibility, both roads and waterways have very similar 
effects on urban development, increasing population by? 1,300 inhabitants if a city was 
located on a major road or a navigable river. The elasticity of log-population is found to 
be very large (0.59) and significant.   
 
[Table 3]   21
 
Let us now consider the role of institutions in influencing urban development. Table 3 
(models 2, 3) reports the empirical estimates of a slightly modified version of (2), that 
is: 
 
(3)   it i jt it it j t it comune ns institutio X university d pop ε δ γ β α δ + + + + + + = −1 ) ln(  
 
where  universityit-1 stands for the presence of a university institution in the city in 
century t-1. It might be objected that this variable is probably affected by endogeneity. 
However, as convincingly argued by Ascheri (1994), throughout the Middle and 
Modern Ages, universities were founded, not as specific results of government 
planning, but because of unpredictable choices made by one or a group of experts on 
given matters. Hence, my analysis did not consider the university variable as an 
endogenous regressor, although, as a precaution, it considered the lagged value of the 
variable.
12 
The variable institutionsjt is the quality of regional government at time t, while comune 
is the above-described variable denoting prior history as a free city state. Matrix Xit is 
the set of variables considered in regression (2).  
Interestingly, the coefficients of all the additional variables in models 2 and 3 have the 
expected signs and are highly significant. Also evidenced is the positive effect of 
regional institutions, implying that high-quality institutions in the region provided fertile 
soil for urban development. Also to be noted is that when institutions are considered, 
urban potential becomes not significant. Having been a free city state in the Early   22
Middle Ages (commune) increases city population by 1,480 inhabitants, while the 
presence of a university does so by 2,460. 
In models 4 and 5, I divided the sample between cities with populations larger than or 
equal to 10,000 inhabitants and smaller cities. The burden of physical geography is 
significant only for larger cities, implying a sort of nonlinear effect of geography 
between large and small cities. The presence of a university turns out to be very large 
and highly significant for larger cities, while the communal past is important in 
explaining urban population only in the case of smaller cities. It seems from the results 
for models 4 and 5 that, from an institutional viewpoint, university is more important 
than a city’s institutional past only for large cities. Finally, I used model 6 to look at 
development differentials within the North and test the robustness of the coefficient 
associated with comune, which, in this case, slightly increases, while its significance is 
maintained.  
Although I considered regional dummy variables and several time-invariant variables in 
the specification of (3), I could not exclude the existence of further heterogeneity. In 
order to address this issue, I estimated fixed effects regressions where all time-invariant 
variables (port, comune, altitude, accessibility) were interacted with a full set of time 
dummy variables. Panel B reports the coefficient estimates of time-varying variables as 
well as p-values of tests for joint significance of interacted time-invariant variables. 
Physical geography is found to be significant, while the elasticity of urban development 
to urban potential is still not significant. As for institutions, university is positive and 
marginally significant only in models 7 and 8, while there is no evidence of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
12 To this end, I extended the dataset to consider also the year 1200 only for the university variable. 
However, it should be mentioned that very few universities had been established at that time.   23
particular importance of regional institutions. Interestingly, comune  maintains its 
significance across all models as from the p-values of the significance tests. 
The next step in the econometric analysis was estimation of a growth regression in the 
form: 
 
(4) it jt it t j t it it ns institutio X pop d pop pop ε δ γ β α δ + + + + + + = − − − i 1 100 comune ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(  
 
The results in table 4 show that a city located in a mountainous area had, on average, a 
population growth rate almost ten percentage points lower than that of a city in the 
lowlands, and as from models 3 and 6, the presence of a port increased the growth rate 
by 31.6%-32.6%, depending on city size. As regards institutions, it is interesting to note 
that university has a very large and significant impact on urban growth. It should be 
stated that the specification of (4) considered the centennial growth rate as a dependent 
variable. This does not pose particular problems in the estimation and interpretation of 
the coefficient estimates, with the sole exception of the period 1800-1861, which is 
unequally spaced with respect to the others. Although the results are not reported for the 
sake of brevity, I estimated equation (4) excluding that period and found that the results 
did not change significantly. 
  
[Tables 4 and 5] 
 
Owing to the structure of the database, the analysis may have suffered from a selection 
bias imposed by logarithmic specification for cities with populations smaller than 5,000. 
In order to overcome this problem, table 5 reports estimates for balanced panels for both   24
level and growth regressions. Interestingly, comune and university maintain their sign 
and significance, while institutions loses its significance. This result casts some doubt 
on the relevance of regional institutions in explaining urban development, once 
heterogeneity has been fully considered. A similar consideration applies to the urban 
potential.  
Accessibility is found to be significant, while altitude is not significant (with the 
exception of model 5) and in one case changes the sign of the coefficient. 
The econometric evidence presented thus far shows a plausible link among institutions, 
geography and urban development, and it seemingly confirms my argument for the use 
of past institutional variables as instruments for the density of firms. In the next section 
I propose some evidence that the effects of past institutions  persist through the density 
of economic activities. 
 
4. The historical roots of agglomeration economies 
A large body of literature has provided evidence on the positive effect of firm density 
on productivity, as a measure of agglomeration economies. Since the seminal work by 
Ciccone and Hall (1996), the major challenge faced by analysts has been to devise the 
right set of instruments with which to identify the parameter associated with the density 
of economic activities. As recognized and discussed in Krugman (1991b), industrial 
location follows a path-dependent process mainly imposed by increasing returns. 
Combes et al. (2009) estimate agglomeration economies in France by using population 
density in 1831 and a set of indicators measuring land characteristics as instruments for 
the density of firms. They find that the elasticity of wage and productivity to firm 
density lies between 0.03 and 0.05.   25
As discussed in Section 2, in the case of Italy, the legacy of Repubbliche Comunali 
consisted in a sound and stable body of local commercial laws, the so-called Statuti 
Comunali, which fostered firm birth and, in the long run, industrial development. In my 
model, prior history as a free city state should be correlated with current firm density 
owing to the persistence of rules and laws protecting property rights.  
Combes et al. (2009) estimate the impact of firm density on wages and total factor 
productivity. Neither variable is available in the case of Italian cities; hence I used 
taxable per capita income from work as a measure of wage or development.
13  
From a formal point of view, I estimated the following model: 
 
(5)  i j i i i ij ns institutio comune university X density firm ξ ϖ δ γ β α + + + + + =  
 
(6)  i i i i density cfirm bX a income ε + + + =  
 
where firm density for city i in region j is the (log) of the ratio between the number of 
firms and total city surface in 2001, university is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the 
city had a university in 1861 and 0 otherwise, institutions is the average across time of 
the variable measuring the quality of regional institutions, income is (log) taxable 
income per capita in 2001. Vector X comprises a set of variables including altitude and 
port, road and waterway accessibility as defined in the previous section.  
Before the results are described, some comments on the hypotheses underlying the 
estimation of model (5)-(6) are required. 
                                                           
13 Note that the Italian fiscal system is homogeneous across space and that my variable of interest 
excludes capital income.   26
Combes et al. (2009) use population density in 1831 as a history-related instrument to 
explain exogenously the current level of firm density in France. In the previous section I 
showed that the urban populations of Italian cities are clearly related to past institutions 
and some of the geographical variables. With these results in mind, in model (5)-(6), I 
chose, not the population in 1861 (or in any other century) as an instrument for firm 
density, but rather its determinants, so that in the first stage regression in (5) 
institutional and geographical variables took the place of past population. 
The exclusionary restrictions imposed that university, comune and institutions influence 
income  only through the density of firms. This hypothesis was justified by the 
discussion in previous sections, so that it was assumed that good institutions enforced 
property rights protection through a set of norms and commercial habits which 
enhanced private initiative. The environment proved to be congenial for firm birth and 
the consolidation of entrepreneurship behavior. However, in what follows, I report a 
number of sensitivity checks conducted to verify the robustness of the hypothesis under 
investigation.  
To be noted is that the geographical variables in the basic model were only those found 
to be relevant in explaining past urban development. Furthermore, I assumed that they 
affected per capita income not only through firm density (hence through firm location), 
but also directly, possibly because of transport cost differentials. 
A final point  concerns the choice of the dependent variable in (6), which is income and 
not, as is common in the literature, productivity or wage rate. However, the 
aforementioned literature assumes that denser places produce higher productivity and 
wages, which are reasonably associated with higher per capita income. Hence, in the   27
case of equation (6) I considered a sort of reduced form estimation linking firm density 
to income, without providing the intermediate effect on productivity or wage.  
 
[Tables 6, 7] 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the estimation of equations (5)-(6). Models 1 and 2 in 
Panel A, in particular, show the coefficient estimates of first-stage regressions for the 
entire sample. The coefficient for port  is significant and large, while there is no 
evidence that altitude  has an impact on the density of economic activities. The 
coefficient for university is significant and larger than the coefficient for comune, while 
institutions is found to be significant at 5% level. Panel B reports estimates of second-
stage regressions. It is found that the elasticity of income to firm density is very close to 
the value 0.1. The other variables altitude and port are not or marginally significant in 
explaining income in the cities of the sample. In both models, the Hansen J test for 
over-identifying restrictions had very large p-values, although it seems that the quality 
of the instruments is lower when also the variable institutions is considered. This is 
reasonable, because this variable is measured at regional level. Also the F statistic for 
weak instruments has comfortably? large values.  
In model 3, I introduced a different variable in place of comune, namely statuto. This 
variable was very likely to be measured with error because it took the value of 1 if the 
city had a Statuto Comunale in the Middle Ages and 0 otherwise. The reason why this 
was measured with error is that the source was the Statuti Comunali collection 
maintained by the Senate of the Italian Republic. This collection cannot be considered 
complete because some cities may have had a Statuto which was not collected by the   28
Senate for some reason. Hence, the variable statuto may have under-measured the 
phenomenon of interest. Also to be noted is that the correlation between comune and 
statuto  is approximately 0.30. This variable is nevertheless interesting because it 
provides a clearer rationale for the long-run regressions in (5) and (6) and because it 
provides a robustness check for comune. As with Panel A, I found that the coefficient 
for statuto was larger than that for comune, while the elasticity to firm density was very 
close to the one in model 2. In addition, no substantial changes occurred in the tests for 
the quality of the instruments.  
Models (4) and (5) present the results when differences internally to the Center-North 
were considered. They show that the coefficient associated with university decreases, 
while the one for comune is higher. The variable statuto is found to be only weakly 
significant, although in the specification of model (5) the p-value of the test for over-
identifying restrictions was particularly high. Also in this case, however, the elasticity 
of income to firm density is very close to 0.1. 
The tests on the instruments did not reject the hypothesis that past institutions do not 
have an impact on income only through firm density. As a further check, in table 9, I 
add the institutional variables one at a time. If the instruments are valid, the coefficient 
associated with these additional regressors must not be significantly different from zero 
and the elasticity to the density of firms should remain significant and stable across the 
specifications. The results in table 7 confirm my hypotheses, although in the case of 
institutions the p-value for the Hansen J test is low. 
The results presented thus far confirm my argument concerning the historical roots of 
the geographical concentration of firms. However, they may still be biased by the 
structure of the economy and by social capital, because both variables were not included   29
in the second-stage regressions and could be among the long-run outputs of past 
institutions. 
Models (1) and (4) in table 8 report estimates including the share of agriculture in 1971 
(as measured by the share of firms located in the city included in the agriculture sector 
by the 1971 Census) in order to take account of the possibility that past institutions may 
have provided incentives for a particular specialization of the economy. Furthermore, I 
exclude the instrument institutions because it does not seem to pass the test proposed 
previously. 
Interestingly, it emerges that agriculture is negatively correlated to firm density, which 
is to be expected because of competition for land. Moreover, agriculture proves 
significant in explaining income per capita only for cities in the Center-North. Note also 
that in both model (1) and (4), the sign and significance of the instruments is preserved, 




In the spirit of Putnam (1993) and Tabellini (2007), Guiso et al. (2007) assume that 
comune influences culture in Italian cities and hence their development. In orderdeal 
with this literature,? in models (2) and (5) in table 8, I have added the number of not-
for-profit organizations per capita in 2001 as an exogenous variable in model (5)-(6). 
The rationale for including this variable is that the aforementioned literature uses it as a 
proxy for social capital and trust because it is closely related to volunteering and hence 
to generalized trust. The results in table 8 show that the coefficient associated with the   30
variable under scrutiny is significant, with negative sign, in explaining firm density and, 
with positive sign, for income.  
However, these results may be biased by potential endogeneity, as also shown by the 
very low p-value of the Hansen J-statistics. Hence, in models (3) and (6) I treated the 
number of not-for-profit organizations as an endogenous variable with the same 
instruments as firm density. It turns out that firm density maintains its sign and 
significance, while not-for-profit organizations per capita are not found to be 
significant. Hence, according to my analysis and contrary to the previous literature, I do 
not find a long-run impact of past institutions when firm density is taken into account. 
In general, the results of the econometric analysis presented in this section seem to 
confirm the path dependence characterizing development because cities with good past 
institutions have higher densities of economic activities and income. Those cities are 
also the ones which were larger and grew faster in the years between 1300 and 1861.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The geography of economic activities and its importance in local development is one of 
the main issues in economic geography. In this paper I have tried to link this theme with 
the concept of path dependence by showing that the process of firm agglomeration is 
deeply influenced by both geography and the quality of institutions. 
The recent economic literature has proposed two conflicting views of economic 
development: the “institutions” view and the “geography” one. In light  of a model of 
the pre-industrial city, I have espoused a third way that may be called the “institutions 
and geography” view. This holds that the development process, at least at local level, is 
deeply influenced by both the quality of institutions and the geography burden. In   31
particular, I have argued that good geographical conditions and good institutions (which 
enacted enduring pro-market laws) can be conceived as fundamental forces behind the 
growth and development of cities.  
Using a new dataset on a large panel of Italian cities, I have provided some econometric 
evidence in support of this research hypothesis. In particular, I have found that 
accessibility and the presence of a seaport have been as important as good formal 
institutions for urban development. Interestingly, also the presence of a university has 
been found to be a key factor in the making of modern cities, although this variable 
should be not considered as a measure of the presence of human capital, but rather as a 
liberal institution.  
To sum up, my historical evidence shows that past institutions and first-nature 
geography have an evident role in explaining cross-city variations of development 
across the centuries. I have consequently used the quality of past institutions as an 
instrument with which to identify the impact of firm density on income, while I have 
not restricted the role of geography in shaping development only through firm density. 
In particular, by means of instrumental variable regressions, I have found that the 
density of economic activities is positively influenced by good past institutions and by 
the presence of a port. The elasticity of per capita income to firm density has been found 
to be 0.08-0.1 depending on the specification. Although these results should be treated 
with caution, they nevertheless point out the long-run determinant role? of institutions 
and, only in part, of geography.  
In general, my analysis suggests that the origin of agglomeration economies in Italy, 
especially in the Center-Northern part of the country, is rooted in history. 
   32
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Appendix 1 
Cities in the sample   
 
Abbiategrasso, Acerra, Acireale, Acquaviva, Acqui, Adernò, Adria, Afragola, Agira, 
Agnone, Agrigento, Aidone, Airola, Alatri, Alba, Alcamo, Alessandria, Alghero, Alia, 
Altamura, Amalfi, Amelia, Anagni, Ancona, Andria, Angri, Aosta, Apricena, Aragona, 
Arezzo, Ariano, Arpino, Arzano, Ascoli Piceno, Ascoli Satriano, Assisi, Asti, Atri, 
Augusta, Avellino, Aversa, Avigliano, Avola, Bagnara Calabra, Bagnocavallo, Bari, 
Barletta, Barra, Barrafranca, Bassano, Belcastro, Bella, Belluno, Belpasso, Benevento, 
Bergamo, Bernalda, Biancavilla, Biella, Bisaccia, Bisacquino, Bisceglie, Bisignano, 
Bitonto, Bivona, Bologna, Bolzano, Borgetto, Borgo (Stradella), Borgo di Gaeta, 
Bovino, Bra, Brescia, Brindisi, Bronte, Buccino, Burgio, Busto Arsizio, Caccamo, 
Cagliari, Caivano, Calascibetta, Calatafimi, Calitri, Caltabellotta, Caltagirone, 
Caltanissetta, Caltavuturo, Calvello, Camerino, Cammarata, Campagna, Campanaro, 
Campobasso, Campobello , Campobello di Licata, Candela, Canicattì, Canicattini, 
Canosa, Canosa, Capua, Caravaggio, Carignano, Carini, Carpi, Carpino, Carrara, 
Casacalenda, Casale Monferrato, Casalpusterlengo, Casamassima, Cascia, Caserta, 
Casoria, Cassano allo Jonio, Cassino, Castelbuono, Castellammare del Golfo, 
Castellammare di Stabia, Castellana, Castellaneta, Castellazzo Bormida, Castelnuovo 
Scrivia, Castelvetrano, Casterltermini, Castronovo di Sicilia, Castroreale, Castrovillari, 
Catania, Catanzaro, Cattolica Eraclea, Cefalù, Ceglie Messapico, Cento, Cerignola, 
Cerreto Sannita, Cesena, Chiaromonte Gulfi, Chiavari, Chieri, Chieti, Chioggia, Chiusa 
Sclafani, Chivasso, Ciminna, Cingoli, Cinisi, Cinquefondi, Città di Castello, Cittanova, 
Civitanova, Civitavecchia, Codogno, Colle Sannita, Colle Valdelsa, Comacchio, 
Comiso, Como, Conegliano, Conversano, Corato, Corigliano, Corleone, Corneto, 
Corridonia, Cortona, Cosenza, Crema, Cremona, Crotone, Cuneo, Eboli, Empoli, Enna, 
Erice, Fabriano, Faenza, Fano, Fasano, Favara, Feltre, Ferentino, Fermo, Ferrandina, 
Ferrara, Firenze, Florida, Foggia, Foligno, Fondi, Forenza, Forlì, Fossano, 
Fossombrone, Francavilla, Frattamaggiore, Gaeta, Galatina, Galatone, Galliate, 
Gallipoli, Gangi, Garlasco, Genova, Gerace, Giarre, Gibellina, Gioia del Colle, 
Giovinazzo, Giuliano in Campania, Gorizia, Gragnano, Grammichele, Grassano, 
Gravina, Grosseto, Grottaglie, Grotte, Grupo Appula, Gubbio, Iglesias, Imola, Irsina, 
Isernia, Itri, Ivrea, Jesi, Lacedonia, Lanciano, L'Aquila, Largo di Mercato, Larino, 
Laterza, Latiano, Laurenzana, Lauria, Lavello, Lavello, Lecce, Lentini, Leonessa, 
Leonforte, Lercara, Licata, Licodia Eubea, Linguaglossa, Lipari, Livorno, Lodi, 
Longobucco, Lucca, Lucera, Lugo, Lungro, Macerata, Maddaloni, Magenta, Maglie, 
Mammola, Manduria, Manfredonia, Mantova, Maratea, Marcianise, Marineo, Marsala, 
Marsico Nuovo, Martina Franca, Massa, Massa Marittima, Massafra, Matera, Mazara, 
Mazzarino, Melfi, Menfi, Mesagne, Messina, Meta, Mezzoiuso, Milano, Milazzo, 
Militello Val Catania, Mineo, Minervino Murge, Misilmeri, Misterbianco, Mistretta, 
Modena, Modica, Modugno, Mola (Formia), Mola di Bari, Molfetta, Moliterno, 
Moncalieri, Mondovì, Monopoli, Monreale, Monselice, Montalcino, Monte 
Sant'Angelo, Montefiascone, Montella, Montemaggiore, Montepulciano, Monterosso 
Almo, Montesarchio, Montescaglioso, Monza, Morano Calabro, Mormanno, Muro 
Lucano, Mussomeli, Napoli, Nardò, Narni, Naro, Nicastro, Nicosia, Niscemi, Nizza, 
Nocera, Noci, Noicataro, Nola, Norcia, Noto, Novara, Novi, Nuoro, Oneglia, Oria, 
Oristano, Orsara Danno Irpina, Orte, Ortona,  Orvieto, Osimo, Ostuni, Ozieri, Padova,   38
Padula, Pagani, Palagonia, Palazzo Adriano, Palazzo San Gervasio, Palazzolo Acreide, 
Palermo, Palma Campania, Palma di Montechiaro, Palmi, Paola, Palo del Colle, Parma, 
Partinico, Paternò, Patti, Pavia, Penne, Pertanna, Perugia, Pesaro, Pescia, Piacenza, 
Piana, Piazza, Piazza Armerina, Piedimonte, Pietragalla, Pietraperzia, Pinerolo, Pisa, 
Pisticci, Pistoia, Pizzo, Polistena, Polizzi, Pomigliano d'Arco, Pontecorvo, Pontedera, 
Popoli, Portici, Porto Maurizio, Potenza, Pozzuoli, Prato, Pratola, Peligna, Prizzi, 
Putignano, Quarto Sant'Elena, Racalmuto, Raffadali, Ragusa, Randazzo, Ravanusa, 
Ravello, Ravenna, Recalbuto, Recanati, Reggio Calabria, Reggio Emilia, Resina, 
Ribeira, Riccia, Riesi, Rieti, Rimini, Rionero in Vulture, Riposto, Roma, Roseto 
Valfortore, Rossano, Rovereto, Rovigno, Rovigo, Ruvo, Sala Consilina, Salemi, 
Salerno, Saluzzo, Sambuca di Sicilia, San Bartolomeo, San Cataldo, San Colombano al 
Lambro, Sant’Elpidio, San Fele, San Fratello, San Gimignano, San Giovanni a 
Tedduccio, San Giovanni in Fiore, San Giovanni Rotondo, San Gregorio , agno, San 
Marco in Lamis, San Miniato, San Nicandro, San Remo, San Severino Marche, San 
Severo, San Vito dei Normanni, Sanbiase, Santa Caterina, Santa Eufemia, Santa 
Margherita di Belice, Santa Maria a Vico, Santa Maria Capua Vetere, Santa Ninfa, 
Sant'Agata di Puglia, Sant'Angelo Lodigiano, Sant'Antimo, Santeramo in Colle, Santo 
Stefano, Quisquina, Sarno, Saronno, Sassano, Sassari, Savigliano, Savona, Scafati, 
Sciacca, Scicli, Scordia, Secondigliano, Senigallia, Seregno, Serradifalco, Sessa 
Aurunca, Sestri Ponente, Sezze, Siculiana, Siena, Siracusa, Sora, Sora, Soresina, 
Sortino, Spaccafurno, Spezia, Spinazzola, Spoleto, Stigliano, Strongoli, Subiaco, 
Sulmona, Taormina, Taranto, Teano, Teggiano, Tempio Pausania, Teramo, Terlizzi, 
Termini, Terni, Terranova di Sicilia, Terrasini, Tivoli, Todi, Tolentino, Torino, Toritto, 
Torre Annunziata, Torre del Greco, Torre Maggiore, Tortona, Trani, Trapani, Treia, 
Trento, Treviglio, Treviso, Tricarico, Trieste, Triggiano, Trinitapoli, Trino, Troia, 
Troina, Tropea, Tuscania, Udine, Urbino, Valenza, Valguarnera, Valle d'Olmo, Varese, 
Vasto, Velletri, Venezia, Venosa, Vercelli, Veroli, Verona, Viadana, Viareggio, Vibo 
Valentia, Vicenza, Vico del Gargano, Vieste, Vigevano, Viggianello, Viggiano, 
Villarosa, Viterbo, Vittoria, Vizzini, Voghera, Volterra.   39
Appendix 2 
 




This variable is in ‘000 and comes from Malanima (1998), where one observation per 
century is available. The dataset reports information only for cities with populations 
larger than 5,000. 
 
Altitude 
The source for this variable is the Atlante Statistico dei Comuni. 
 
Institutions 
This is a seven point scale with the following classification 
Index  Form of government 
1  Absolutism   
2 Non-bureaucratic  absolutism 
3 Strong-prince  proto-absolutism 
4 Feudal  anarchy 
5 Princes  controlled  extra-constitutionally by powerful 
magnates 
6 Independent  city-republics 
7  Weak prince standestaats 
The sources for this variable are De Long and Shleifer (1993) and Tabellini (2007). 
 
Comune 
This variable is intended to capture the long-run effect of a period of democracy. It is a 
dummy variable taking value 1 if the city was an autonomous municipality  from the 
tenth to the thirteenth centuries. The sources for this variable are: Ascheri (2006), Guiso 
et al. (2007), Milani (2005), and the atlas Atlante Storico De Agostini and Nuovissimo 
Atlante Storico Mondiale.  
 
Port and accessibility 
The dummy variable for the presence of a port is taken from du Jourdin (1993) and 
from Atlante Storico De Agostini and Nuovissimo Atlante Storico Mondiale. My  index 
of road accessibility takes value 1 if the city was on the Roman road network and 0 
otherwise. For inland waterway accessibility, the index is a dummy variable taking 
value 1 if the city was on a navigable river and 0 otherwise. Data are from Atlante 
Storico De Agostini and Nuovissimo Atlante Storico Mondiale and books in the series 
Le città nella storia d’Italia, Laterza.  
 
University 
The sources for the university variable are Atlante Storico De Agostini and Nuovissimo 
Atlante Storico Mondiale.  
 
Income 
The source for taxable income per capita is ANCITEL.   40
 
Statuto 
This variable takes value 1 if the city had a Statuto Comunale and 0 otherwise. The 
source for this variable is the Collezione degli Statuti Comunali maintained by the 




Firm density and Not-for-profit organizations 




This variable, which measures the percentage of agricultural firms in the total of firms, 




   41
Appendix 3 
The evolution of city size distribution, 1300-1861 
 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
The evolution of urban systems has been one of the most debated topics in the history of 
economics and is currently setting the scene in economic geography (Storper, 2008). 
Recently, works by Eaton and Eckstein (1997) on France and Japan and by Dobkins and 
Ioannides (2001) on the USA, with later works by Black and Henderson (2003) and 
Ioannides and Overman (2003), have established or confirmed certain basic facts about 
urban systems and their development. In particular, city size has been found to be 
distributed according to a Pareto distribution highly stable over time. However, the 
apparent persistence of the Pareto distribution has been in fact characterized by two 
trends: 
-  a very stable ranking of city size at the top of the hierarchy; 
-  substantial changes at the bottom of the distribution reflecting the entry of new 
cities and the rapid growth and decline of the old ones. 
This implies that, although the urban hierarchy is in general very stable over the time, 
intra-distribution dynamics are present and reflect the life cycle of cities. Hence the 
shape as well as the evolution of city size distribution are likely to be driven by the 
fundamental determinants of urban development (Krugman, 1996). 
Within that relative size distribution, individual cities generally grow in population size 
over time; while what is considered a big versus small city in absolute size changes over 
time. While there is entry by new cities and both rapid growth and decline of cities 
nearer the bottom of the urban hierarchy, at the top city size rankings are substantially 
stable over time. Size distributions of cities within countries, at least at the upper tail are 
well approximated by a Pareto distribution. 
Building on the paper by Eaton and Eckstein (1997), Black and Henderson (1999) 
propose a model of endogenous growth in a system of different types of cities. The 
authors consider a typical trade-off faced by a firm in its location decision: that is, the 
trade-off between localized economies of scale and congestion costs. They find that, 
given steady national population growth and human capital accumulation, the size and 
number of cities grow, although a constant relative size distribution persists.
14 This 
constant rank-size rule is also known as the Zipf’s law for cities.  
Following Gabaix and Ioannides (2005), let Si denote the normalized size of city iThe 
Zipf’s law is satisfied if, for large S, we have: 
 
(A1)     α S
c
S Size = > ) Pr(  
 
where c is a positive constant and  1 = α . Equation (A1) implies that the size of a city 
times the percentage of cities of larger size equals a constant. As an approximation of 
the Zipf’s law, the rank-size rule states that if we rank cities from largest to smallest, 
and denote their sizes  ) ( ) 1 ( ... n S S ≥ ≥ , respectively, the rank i for a city of size S(i) is 
proportional to the proportion of cities greater than i. Hence, from equation (A1) we 
                                                           




S i ≅ ) (  where k is a constant. The theoretical properties of the Zipf’s law have 
been extensively studied by Gabaix (1999), who shows that if city growth rates obey 
Gibrat's Law where growth rates are random draws from the same distribution (i.e. 
growth rates are independent of current size), Zipf's Law emerges as the limiting size 
distribution (as long as a lower bound on how far cities can deteriorate in size is 
imposed). As growth is scale invariant, so too is the final distribution. We thus have a 
power law with unitary exponent. By highlighting the role of uncertainty, Gabaix 
(1999) sketches an illustrative model based on on-going natural amenity shocks facing 
cities of any size, which leads to Zipf's Law for the size distribution of cities. 
In recent years, an increasing number of papers have empirically estimated the 
evolution of the Zipf’s law, with particular reference to US cities.
15 Black and 
Henderson (2003) studied the evolution of the size distribution of US cities in the 
twentieth century, finding a stable wide relative size distribution of cities which was 
supported by different types of cities with different industrial compositions 
(specializations). The size distribution exhibited some increasing relative concentration 
which Black and Henderson associated with the recent relative growth of services in the 
US economy. Along the same lines, Dobkins and Ioannides (2001) found evidence of 
parallel growth in US cities, implying a α constant over time. 
The classical regression approach to testing the Zipf’s Law consists in estimating: 
 
(A2)     log(rank)= constant + α∗log(population) + ε 
 
where ε  in an iid error term. If   1 = α , then the rank-size rule holds. One of the main 
concerns is the consistent definition over time of the threshold population size that the 
Zipf’s Law is supposed to mainatin. Some authors use an absolute cut-off point (e.g., 
urban population of 50,000 or more); some use a relative cutoff point (e.g., the 
minimum-size city included in the sample should be 0.30 mean city size); and others 
look at a set number (e.g., 50 or 100) of the largest cities.   
 
[Insert table A1 about here] 
 
Table A1 Panel A reports estimates of the Zipf’s exponent for both the full sample and 
the upper tail of the distribution, i.e. cities in the top one-third of the size distribution. In 
both cases, there is a slight decline in the concentration of city population, although the 
Pareto distribution, as expected, is very likely to hold only for larger cities. Interestingly 
enough, since 1600, the distribution of cities in the upper tail has been substantially 
stable, confirming the preliminary evidence offered in table 1 in the main text. This 
result partly holds also for the full sample, although the decline in the Pareto exponent 
seems to be more marked.   
Panels B and C in table A1 present empirical results for the Zipf’s Law estimation for 
the Center-North and the South. Although in some cases the number of observations is 
low and does not allow estimation of the exponent of the power law, it nevertheless 
emerges that the urban hierarchy was more pronounced in the Center-North than in the 
South, although in both cases, the Pareto distribution seemed to hold for the top 1/3 of 
the distribution. In addition, it is interesting to note that the concentration of population 
                                                           
15 See e.g. the survey in Gabaix and Iannides (2005).   43
among cities was stronger in the South than in the North during the fourteenth century, 
but convergence towards a 0.946-0.992 value of the exponent took place over the 
centuries, leading to a substantially equal distribution of city population between 
Center-Northern and Southern cities. 
 
 
 Table 1: The ten largest cities in Italy, 1300-2001 
1300  1500  1700  1861  1901  1951  2001 
Milano  150  Napoli  150  Napoli  220  Napoli  419  Napoli  564  Roma  1702  Roma  2460 
Venezia  110  Venezia  102  Roma  140  Milano  196  Milano  492  Milano  1277  Milano  1183 
Firenze  110  Milano  100  Venezia  138  Roma  188  Roma  463  Napoli  1025  Napoli  993 
Genova  60  Genova  70  Palermo  110  Torino  181  Torino  336  Torino  722  Torino  857 
Bologna  50  Bologna  55  Milano  109  Palermo  168  Palermo  310  Genova  688  Palermo  653 
Siena  50  Roma  55  Firenze  72  Genova  128  Genova  235  Palermo  503  Genova  604 
Palermo  50  Firenze  50  Genova  64  Venezia  114  Firenze  206  Firenze  391  Bologna  370 
Brescia  45  Palermo  50  Bologna  63  Firenze  114  Bologna  152  Bologna  351  Firenze  352 
Cremona  45  Brescia  48  Messina  50  Bologna  90  Venezia  152  Venezia  323  Bari  313 
Padova  40  Cremona  40  Torino  44  Livorno  84  Messina  150  Catania  302  Catania  307 
 
 Table 2: Average city size by population 
 Italy  North  Center  South 
Whole 
Sample 
13.500 20,564 13,250 10.095 
Population> 
10,000 
25,710 34,152 25,100 17,611 
Population< 
10,000 
6,449 6,437 6,303 6,527 
Average in 
1300 
13,197 21,416 13,096  8,984 
Average in 
1861 





































 Table 3: Geography, Institutions and Urban development (Dependent variable is log city population, in ‘000) 













































































































































































   [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
R
2  0.27 0.36 0.39  0.38 0.25  0.46  0.41  0.44  0.46 0.23  0.39 
Number of 
observation 
1699 1699  1699  512 1077  907  1699  1699  512 1077  907 
Note: GLS random effect estimation with robust standard errors, with z-statistics in parentheses, are reported in Panel A. Panel B reports fixed effects estimates with t-
statistics in parentheses. P-values of the test for joint significance of the variable interacted with a full set of dummy variables are in brackets. A constant and a full set 
of time and regional dummies are always included though not reported. *** indicates significance at 99% confidence level; ** indicates significance at 95% 






 Table 4: Geography, Institutions and Urban growth (Dependent variable is centennial population growth) 






































































































































































































 [0.04]  [0.22]  [0.03]  [0.08] 
                      
R
2 0.39  0.40  0.42  0.46  0.74  0.46  0.64  0.65  0.68  0.82  0.68 
Number of 
observation 
1040  1040  1040 433  607  581  1040 1040 433 607 581 
Note: GLS random effect estimation with robust standard errors, with z-statistics in parentheses, are reported in Panel A. Panel B reports fixed effects estimates with t-
statistics in parentheses. P-values of the test for joint significance of the variable interacted with a full set of dummy variables are in brackets. A constant and a full set 
of time and regional dummies are always included though not reported. *** indicates significance at 99% confidence level; ** indicates significance at 95% 
confidence level; * indicates significance at 90% confidence level.  
 
 
 Table 5: Geography, institutions, urban development and growth – Balanced panel 
  Panel A: Random effect 
estimates (Dep. Var.: log 
population) 
Panel B: Fixed effect 
estimates (Dep. Var.: log 
population) 
Panel C: Random effect 
estimates (Dep. Var.: 
Centennial growth) 
Panel D: Fixed effect 






















































































































































2 0.38  0.46  0.42  0.36  0.42  0.46  0.64  0.65 
Number of 
observations 
1699 907  1699 907 1040 581 1040 581 
Note: GLS random effect estimation with robust standard errors. z-statistics are in parentheses. A constant and a full set of time and regional dummies (North, Centre, 
South, Sardinia and Sicily) are always included though not reported. *** indicates significance at 99% confidence level; ** indicates significance at 95% confidence 
level; * indicates significance at 90% confidence level. In models 3, 4, 7, 8 altitude, road accessibility, waterways accessibility, port and comune are interacted with a 
full set of time dummy variables. The corresponding values in brackets report p-values for a test of joint significance of the interacted variables. 
 Table 6: Long run regressions 
  Panel A: First stage regressions. Dependent variable is Firm Density in 2001 (in logs) 





















































































  Panel B: Second stage regressions. Dependent variable is Income per capita in 2001 
(in logs) 






















































2  0.62 0.67 0.67 0.56 0.49 
Number of 
observations 
563 563 563 269 269 
p- value of Hansen J 
statistic 
0.85 0.33 0.33 0.20 0.81 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Wald F statistic 
20.88 14.79 16.39 8.916  8.26 
Note: t statistics are in parentheses. A constant is always included though not reported. *** indicates significance at 















 Table 7: Robustness checks on the validity of the instruments: Second stage regressions 
(Dependent variable is log income per capita) 






















































































































    0.08 
(1.50) 
   
Comune   0.01 
(0.65) 
    - 0 . 0 5  
(-1.51) 
  
Institutions     -0.05 
(-1.45) 
    0.005 
(0.10) 
 
Statuto      0.01 
(0.03) 
    -0.01 
(-0.62) 
R
2  0.75 0.68 0.62 0.68 0.68 0.34 0.56 0.44 
Number of 
observations 
563 563 563 563 269 269 269 269 
p- value of 
Hansen J 
statistic 
0.26 0.32 0.98 0.32 0.54 0.89 0.07 0.99 
Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald 
F statistic 
13.78 15.33 18.92 14.34 14.88 15.80 12.69  7.82 
Note: t statistics are in parentheses. A constant is always included though not reported. *** indicates significance at 










 Table 8: Sensitivity analysis 
  Panel A: First stage regressions. Dependent variable is Firm Density in 2001 (in logs) 









IV on NP 
4  
Only cities in the 
Center-North 
5  
Only cities in the 
Center-North 
6  
Only cities in the 
Center-North 

































































































  Panel B: Second stage regressions. Dependent variable is Income per capita in 2001 (in logs) 




















































































2  0.67 0.79 0.59  0.52  0.73  0.68 
Number of 
observations 
366 366 366  152  152  152 
p- value of 
Hansen J 
statistic 
0.62 0.02 Just 
identified 
0.02 0.02  Just  identified 
Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F 
statistic 
17.31 19.92    9.76  12.42   
Note: t statistics are in parentheses. A constant and a full set of regional dummies are always included though not 
reported. *** indicates significance at 99% confidence level; ** indicates significance at 95% confidence level; * 








Table A1: Parametric estimation of city size distribution   
  Panel A: Whole sample 
  Full sample  Cities in top 1/3 of size distribution 
  at R
2  Obs. at R
2  Obs. 
1300 0.786 
(0.016) 






























0.783 510 0.902 
(0.021) 
0.926 170 
  Panel B: Cities in the Centre-North 
  Full sample  Cities in top 1/3 of size distribution 
  at R
2  Obs. at R
2  Obs. 
1300 0.786 
(0.019) 
































0.878 157 0.992 
(0.029) 
0.957 52 
  Panel C: Cities in the South 
  Full sample  Cities in top 1/3 of size distribution 
 a t R
2  Obs. at R
2  Obs. 
1300 0.937 
(0.029) 






a a a 
1500 0.955 
(0.033) 




















0.842 353 0.946 
(0.019) 
0.953 126 
Note: Biased standard errors in parentheses. (
a): The paucity of the number of observations does not allow correct 
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Note: The surface area used to calculate population density in 1861 is that reported in the 2001 Census. 
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Note: The surface area used to calculate population density in 1861 is that reported in the 2001 Census. 
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